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This article accepts the dependency school's emphasis
on the importance of analysing characteristics of the
international capitalist system when seeking to
understand the causes of underdevelopment see Palma
1978! rather than focusing mainly on conditions within
a peripheral economy in isolation. Starting with some
consideration of certain features of the world capitalist
system we can suggest the sort of general limitations
one would expect to find on late industrial development
in any peripheral economy trading freely with developed
industrial countries. We can then go on to examine
the experience of industry in the Republic of Ireland
in the light of these expectations.
Developed Capitalism and Peripheral Industry
As Bienefeld and Innes 11976! argue, established
industries based in the developed economies have
great competitive advantages over the relative new-
comers in the periphery; these advantages, they say,
derive from long-accumulated resources of capital,
proprietary technology, large established markets,
managerial skills and political influence. To these
factors may be added the advantages inherent in an
established industrial economy which derive from the
external economies of large industrial centres. All
these factors combine to give established producers
based in industrialised economies competitive advantages
in most sectors of industry over newcomers in peripheral
economies.
These competitive advantages are very important in
practice because of the world economy's history of
recurring depressions and persistent underemployment
of productive resources in the periphery, which means
that available markets tend to be relatively limited
when measured against supplies of productive resources,
and that competition for these markets is intense. In
these conditions, the large established industries based
in the developed economies are able to dominate
international markets in most sectors, at the expense
of newcomers in the periphery, so that most industrial
production remains concentrated in the developed
countries. The peripheral economies generally find it
very difficult to gain international markets for most
industrial products, apart from a very limited range of
sectors.
The argument above does not completely rule out the
possibility of private indigenous industrial development
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in peripheral economies trading freely with core industrial
countries, but it does suggest that such development
will necessarily be very limited. But in certain industries
where the factors giving rise to established industry
competitive advantage are not of great importance,
real opportunities exist for indigenous enterprises in
the periphery to compete effectively in international
markets. Also, perhaps more commonly. in cases
where these factors give established producers only
quite small advantages which can be offset by transport
costs or the advantages of proximity. indigenous
enterprises in the periphery may be able to compete
effectively in the domestic market.
These considerations suggest that the type of indigenous
exporting industries one could expect to find in a late-
industrialising peripheral economy would be industries
using relatively simple or standardised mature technology
which can be readily purchased, and having one or
more of the following characteristics: labour intensity.
local craft intensity, a low modern industrial skill
content, or low value added to local primary resources.
In addition, in most cases, a fairly small scale and
limited fixed assets would be expected. Indigenous
industries oriented to the unprotected home market
could also include other products with a low value/bulk
ratio, such as building materials, and sectors where
close regular contact with the local market is important,
such as printing, packaging and building. lt is important.
however, in considering these opportunities for
indigenous industry in the periphery, to note that they
are quite limited. There is no necessary reason why
the scope for industrialisation in sectors such as these
should be sufficient for all available resources of
either capital or labour to find employment within a
late-industrialising peripheral economy under a free
trade.
Under a protectionist policy, the scope for indigenous
industrialisation in the periphery widens to include
other sectors which do not have a genuine competitive
advantage; the first to benefit would be those most
similar in character to the peripheral industries (outlined
above), and it would commonly include the final
stages of pmduction or assembly of previously imported
goods for the local market in order to avoid the tariff
barriers. Some of the 'infant industries' established
behind protective barriers could prove viable after a
return to free trade, but the gap between the developed
industrial economies and the periphery in the twentieth
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century seems to be such that relatively few protected
'infant industries' or 'infant economies' prove capable
of significantly expanding manufactured exportsan
indication that a true competitive advantage has
developed. The failure to develop exports combined
with rising imports of industrial inputs is a major
cause of the balance of payments difficulties which
generally afflict protected peripheral economies.
In some countries, however (Japan is the main example),
where the state has taken up a very active and direct
role in stimulating technological innovation, skill training
and the co-ordination of the long term development of
specialised integrated industrial structures, 'late'
development of some genuinely competitive industrial
sectors of importance has appeared possible.
In looking at the experience of industry in the Republic
of Ireland we are considering one case study of a
formerly protected peripheral economy in the light of
the suggested limitations on indigenous peripheral
industry outlined above. Ireland is a significant case
because in many ways conditions are particularly
favourable for private industrial development compared
with most peripheral economies. These conditions
include a high degree of conservative political stability,
a good education system, a developed infrastructure
and financial services, free access to major markets
(including a position inside the EEC tariff wall in
recent years), and a society which has shown active
entrepreneurial ability in the protected industrial
growth of the 1930s to the 1950s as well as in non-
manufacturing sectors. Thus many of the internal
weaknesses often suggested as general causes of industrial
underdevelopment seem particularly implausible in
the Irish context.
The Historical Background
Until the early nineteenth century Ireland could
reasonably have been described as an industrial economy
by the standards of most European countries with the
major exception of Britain, the pioneer of the industrial
revolution. As late as the census of 1841, for example,
700,000 people almost one quarter of those gainfully
occupiedreported that they were occupied in textile
manufacturing [Cullen 1968J. But during the nineteenth
century industrial employment declined rapidly, except
in the north-eastern region around Belfast, offering
diminishing prospects of employment to the masses
being squeezed out of agriculture. Consequently,
emigration rose to proportions unparelled in any other
country. reducing the labour force of the area which is
today the Republic of Ireland from 3mn in 1841 to just
1 .4mn in 1922 when the Irish Free State was established;
by then only about 100,000 workers (7 per cent of the
labour force) were employed ¡n industry.
The most convincing explanation of the industrial
decline of most of Ireland is the argument that Britain's
early lead in industrial transformation, combined with
the growing importance of economies of scale, external
economies in large industrial centres and specialised
proprietary technology, gave British industries cumula-
tive competitive advantages in free trade within the
United Kingdom of Great Britain anj Ireland. These
advantages were almost impossible for most Irish
industries to resist once the process of Britain's earlier
transformation had begun J see Cullen 1976, O'Malley
1979 J.
The independent Irish state introduced strong measures
to protect industry from outside competition and this
resulted in the doubling of industrial employment
between the early 1930s and the early 1950s, although
the total labour force continued to decline (to 1 .2mn
in 1950 and 1.1 mn in 1971). The protectionist policy,
however, failed to boost exports adequately so that a
series of balance of payments crises occurred in the
1950s, resulting in strong deflationary action by the
government and prolonged recession with the highest
rates of emigration for 80 years. (The figures for net
emigration in the 1950s regularly exceeded 70 percent
of the number of those reaching the age of 15). The
perceived failure of protectionism in the 1950s provided
the cue for a change of policy desired by the country's
dominant agricultural exporting class. The new policy
was to seek participation in the wider free trade
arrangements then emerging in western Europe with
its high food prices; a complementary policy, for
industry, was to encourage export-oriented investment
by foreign firms in order to supplement the employment
and foreign exchange earnings which could be provided
by Ireland's existing industries in free trade
conditions.
Industry since the 1950s
1958 was the year when Ireland's new outward-looking
policies were given formal expression, in a book by the
then Secretary of the Department of Finance f Whitaker
19581 and in the first Programme for Economic
Expansion 119581. Restrictions on foreign direct
investment were mostly removed, full tax remission
on profits arising from industrial exports was introduced
and the intention to seek participation in European
free trade arrangements was announced. Grants of up
to 50 per cent (or more in designated undeveloped
regions) on fixed assets in new industrial investment or
in major expansions of existing industries were also
introduced, and Ireland already had free access to the
United Kingdom market for most manufactured
goods.
The most striking development in industry in Ireland
since 1958 has been the rapid inflow of new export-
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oriented industries under foreign ownership. most of
them subsidiaries of TNCs. These new foreign industries
now employ about 50,000 workers, or about one
quarter of the manufacturing labour force and, with
most of their output exported (88 per cent in 1973).
they have made a very substantial contribution to
raising exports and easing the balance of payments
constraint.
While new foreign industries have thus made a substantial
impact on growth, employment and exports, their low
backward and forward linkages. their use of proprietary
technology imported from parent companies, and
their low demand for highly skilled technical and
scientific workers all combine to minimise their
secondary impact on the country's prospects for
developing a less dependent form of industrial structure
capable of self-sustaining growth. The inflow of new
foreign investment has been insufficient to generate
conditions even approaching full employment; clearly
a greater contribution from Irish industry is required.
and new foreign industries appear to have done little
to stimulate such a development. Ireland's heavy
reliance on continuing inflows of foreign industrial
investment also leaves the country open to growing
political dependence on foreign enterprises and
governments Isee Stanton 1979 on thisi. But, more
important for the consideration of Ireland as a case
study relevant to development prospects in other
peripheral economies, the most obvious reason why
the policy of encouraging foreign export-oriented
investment cannot be regarded as a major option for
most countries is that, world-wide, it simply does not
occur on a large enough scale. Apart from Ireland, a
small number of (mainly small) countries, such as
Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Puerto Rico, as well as Mexico and Brazil, have
received the bulk of export-oriented foreign investment;
most peripheral economies cannot expect investment
of this type to make any great impact on their economies
see Nayyar 19781. Since rather exceptional circum-
stancessuch as access to large markets, especially
the EEC since 1973have been responsible for the
extent of new foreign direct investment in Ireland, the
rest of this paper will concentrate on other industries,
whose experience provides a truer indication of the
general effects of outward-looking policies in late-
developing peripheral economies and of the potential
for industrialisation with such policies.
Before the protective trade barriers began to be removed
in the mid-1960s there were clear indications that Irish
industry was ill-prepared for free trade in open
international markets. For example, despite the
Republics small market (a population of under 3mn)
and its virtual free access to the far larger British
market, only 19 per cent of industrial output was
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exported in 1960 IMcAleese 19781. One observer has
suggested that most firms were probably only marginal
exporters, ¡e exporting 10-20 per cent of output at
marginal cost. Furthermore, although manufacturing
proper' (ie goods such as textiles, clothing, furniture,
paper, chemicals, metals and engineering) made up 17
per cent of GDP in 1958, while limited processing'
manufactures (mainly food processing and leather)
accounted for only S per cent of GDP, limited processing'
manufactures made up almost two thirds of manu-
factured exports I Farley 1973I; this indicates that the
export potentialor, in other words, the competitive
ability of most of industry, apart from limited processing
of local primary resources, was very weak.
The government appointed Committee on Industrial
Organisation found that most manufacturing concerns
in the early 1960s were producing very largely for the
protected domestic market and consequently were
small in scale and had a considerable variety of products
with short production runs and high unit costs. Mainly
because of the small scale and the assembly type
nature of many of the operations, the technology in
use was rarely developed by the firms themselves and
was rarely the most advanced. Also, compared with
other European countries, expenditure on industrial
research and development was very low I see Cooper
and Whelan 19731.
The fact that many industries were not prepared to
face free trade in the early l9& was officially recognised,
but it was expected, in line with much orthodox'
academic thinking on economic development, that
the pressures of competition would improve efficiency
and promote more specialised, larger scale, technically
advanced production for larger markets. It was
anticipated therefore, that after some restructuring,
although some industries might suffer, many would
face improved prospects for growth under free trade.
Adaptation Councils were instituted for each of 24
industrial sectors to prepare for free trade by promoting
cooperation in purchasing materials, marketing, choosing
areas of specialisation, eliminating uncompetitive product
lines and organising amalgamations of small firms.
Adaptation Grants of up to 25 per cent of restructuring
costs were made available, along with other forms of
assistance, and by 1968 it was reported that such
grants had been approved for firms accounting for at
least 75 per cent of manufacturing output and
employment.
Thus the move to free trade was well prepared and
apparently supported by respectable theory. Tariff
cuts were implemented very gradually over the 10
years 1%5-75 in the case of British goods, and the S
years 1973-78 in the case of products from the EEC;
the move was not sudden. And yet the signs to date are
that most of Irish industry not only failed to benefit
from free trade, but has actually suffered noticeably.
Between 1965 and 1971 the rate of redundancies in
existing industry rose from 700 to 5,000 pa, and in the
four years 1973-76 it is estimated that about 50,000
jobs (about one quarter of the manufacturing labour
force) were permanently lost. Employment in the
older, formerly protected industries has shown a net
decline since 1960, although their output has grown
somewhat as the domestic market has grown;
significantly, too, the proportion of output exported
by these industries did not increase, but rather declined
slightly, between 1960 and 1973 I McAleese 19781.
Thus, up to 1973 at leastand probably up to the
present, the benefits of free trade suggested by the
architects of the outward-looking policies have not
materialised in the older, formerly protected industries.
Instead, many of them closed down, while most have
so far proved viable only after considerable defensive
investment which was associated with losses of
employment and a shrinking share of a growing home
market. It was in fact officially observed during the
1960s that investment in adaptation for free trade was
mostly not of the type desired; it was going mainly to
increasing productive efficiency in existing activities
rather than to basic restructuring involving larger
scale more specialised activities with an export
orientation see NIEC 19681. There was a strong
tendency to attribute this failure mainly to poor
entrepreneurship, but such an explanation seems rather
weak compared with a more plausible alternative
view.
As suggested earlier, the longer established industries
of the developed industrial economies have great
competitive advantages over small, technologically
weak industries in peripheral economies, such as
those developed in the Republic of Ireland up to the
1960s. Since it is the aim of the private entrepreneur to
seek out opportunities for profitable investment, it is
scarcely an indication of incompetence or excessive
caution if he shrinks from trying to build up large
specialised export-oriented industries in such cir-
cumstances. Once the intensity of competition from
developed industrial economies is fully appreciated.
the Irish entrepreneurs' decision to engage in purely
defensive investment to protect their existing enterprises.
and probably also to invest more in non-manufacturing
sectors, seems unsurprising. For, in a highly competitive
environment, control of large established markets
seems a necessity for motivating large investments in
research, development and production of advanced
specialised industrial productsif the motive is private
profit within a reasonable time span. On the other
hand, ownership of specialised technology and large
productive facilities is necessary to control large markets.
Consequently, the small, technologically weak newcomer
with small market shares faces great difficulty in
breaking into international markets in most sectors.
Such a view of the wide and persistent gap between
the industrial potential of established industrial
economies and aspiring late developers seems consistent
with the experience of Irish industryL, the view that
favourable local conditions in a peripheral economy.
combined with market forces, can lead to continuing
development until the less developed country evolves
into a developed one does not seem so.
Some suggestions were made above concerning the
nature of the limited range of industries which could
prove viable for indigenous private enterprise in a
peripheral economy trading freely with developed
industrial countries. A brief examination of the activities
of Irish companies in 1979 reveals no major examples
which conflict with these suggestions. Banking and
finance is mostly controlled by Irish companies. and
outside that sector there are 66 publicly quoted
companies on the stock exchange. of which 57 had
majority holdings of equity owned within the state
Irish Times, 1. 2 January 1979!. If we include one
large company now registered in another country but
originally based in Ireland, the main activities of the
largest majority Irish-owned stock exchange companies
(largest in terms of sales) are as follows. The four
largest companies. each employing over 5.000 workers,
are mainly engaged in print and packaging. building
materials, brewing and glass. The remainder of the
largest 20, most of which employ between 1,000 and
2,000 workers, are mainly engaged in: food, drink and
tobacco (4); building (2); wholesale and/or retail
distribution (4); carpets; paper; leather; newspapers;
knitwear; distribution and soft drinks. Besides the
publicly quoted limited companies, there are a number
of large agricultural cooperative societies engaged in
food processing; the total sales of the 30 largest coops
are, in fact, greater than those of the 30 largest
publicly-quoted industrial and trading companiesan
illustration of the importance and scale of food processing
compared with other Irish industry.
To focus particularly on new (ie post-l950s) Irish
industries, food processing is the dominant activity
among enterprises employing over 50 workers, while
the smaller ones have a more diverse range of activities
including some branches of engineering and electronics.
However, these small industries appear to be generally
confined to relatively labour intensive activities using
simple technology.
The activities of Irish companies are noticeably lacking
in the major high technology, capital intensive, large
scale industries which would dominate the list of the
largest companies in developed industrial economies,
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including the smaller developed countries such as
Sweden or Belgium. Thus, apart from some small-
scale activities in certain minor sub-sectors, there are
almost no large Irish private companies operating
independently of major foreign participation in the
extractive industries, nor in metals, engineering, vehicles.
armaments, chemicals or electronics. Irish companies
have, however, proved capable of dominating those
sectors in which it was suggested that indigenous
private enterprise in peripheral economies does not
face serious disadvantages in competition with
established producers in developed countries. The
fact that Irish enterprises have been successful in
these sectors, and only these sectors, suggests that
there are indeed real difficulties impeding entry by
newcomers into competition with established industrial
economies in most major manufacturing sectors. These
difficulties arise from the competitive advantages enjoyed
by the established producers because they have an
established position, rather than from any very obvious
inadequacies of Irish enterprises which private capitalists
can reasonably be expected to attempt to overcome.
lt appears that Irish private industry is mainly confined
at present to a limited range of products with little
potential for diversification. The potential for its
expansion is limited by demand, particularly in the
home market, rather than by the availability of capital
for investment in increased capacity. This is supported
by a lack of any evidence, despite the efforts of some
studies, of a causal link between increases in industrial
profits and subsequent growth of industrial investment
and output. Growth of output has, however, been
related to growth of home demand. Furthermore,
there appears to be a growing tendency, which has
been little studied, for large Irish industrial companies
to invest their profits in non-industrial sectors and in
acquisitions of foreign companies rather than in
expansion and diversification of their manufacturing
activities in Ireland. Again, this would suggest that the
potential for indigenous Irish industrial diversification
and expansion is limited.
ConcIuson
lt seems likely, in view of the many different social
formations in different countries, that the dependency
approach to understanding peripheral societies will
remain a broad approach rather than a formal theory.
This paper, however, has suggested that a similar set
of constraints may serve to limit the possibilities of
indigenous private industrial development in all late-
developing peripheral economies which trade freely
with developed industrial countries, and that, in view
of the competitive advantages of established industrial
producers, indigenous industries would tend to be
limited to sectors using simple. or standardised mature
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technology, and having characteristics such as labour
intensity, local craft intensity, low value added to local
primary resources, low value/bulk ratio and clear
advantages arising from close regular contact with the
local market. In the Republic of Ireland, sectors such
as these are quite well develqped mainly by indigenous
enterprises which do not seem capable of much further
diversification despite the availability of capital and
labour and free access to large markets.
The long experience of the decline of Irish industry
under free trade during the century before the
1930sapparently because of growing competition
from British industries which were gaining increasing
advantages arising from developing economies of scale,
external economies, specialised skills and technology
and proximity to the major growing marketssupports
the general view that conditions have developed over
a long period of time which give the earliest established
industrial economies substantial competitive advantages
over the relatively small and weak industries of peripheral
economies aspiring to late development.
The main strategic options for late industrialisation
now seems to focus either on some form of sustained
protection or on very substantial activity by the state
in the interests of the long term development of
specialised technology, skills and productive facilities
which could eventually result in wider areas of genuine
competitive advantage under free trade. The protec-
tionist option depends heavily on a country's ability to
overcome the balance of payments constraint in the
face of rising imports of industrial inputs such as
materials, capital equipment and technology, which
cannot possibly be produced domestically for long.
For most countries, apart from those with particularly
valuable natural resources, this means that exports of
industrial products must be expanded eventually here
again. co-ordinated intervention by the state to attain
long term development goals seems essential. The
viability of either of these options therefore ultimately
depends on which social classes control or influence
state power. and to what purpose.
note: the more general dependency references are not given
here but in the bibliography at the end of thisBulletin.
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